

## **FEATURES OF ELECTORAL VOLATILITY AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL IN UKRAINE ACCORDING TO THE RESULTS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OF 2012/2014 AND 2014/2019**

The electoral volatility at the national level based on the results of the 2012/2014 and 2014/2019 parliamentary elections in terms of general, intra-systemic and non-systemic volatility has been analyzed. The features of three types of electoral volatility at the level of the main regions of Ukraine: West, Center, South and East have been investigated. The importance of party preferences of regions in the context of electoral volatility has been outlined. The method of the total electoral volatility calculating using the M. Pedersen index and intra-system and extra-system volatility on the basis of the indices modified by E. Powell and D. Tucker have been worked out. The drawing on the analysis of the results of opinion polls, the grounds / motives for changing electoral support have been considered.

*Keywords: M. Pedersen's electoral volatility index, general electoral volatility, intra-system electoral volatility, non-systemic electoral volatility, parties, stable parties, new parties, region, region, Ukraine.*

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## **ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ЕЛЕКТОРАЛЬНОЇ ВОЛАТИЛЬНОСТІ НА РЕГІОНАЛЬНОМУ РІВНІ В УКРАЇНІ ЗА РЕЗУЛЬТАТАМИ ПАРЛАМЕНТСЬКИХ ВИБОРІВ 2012/2014 ТА 2014/2019 РОКІВ**

Проаналізовано електоральну волатильність на національному рівні за результатами парламентських виборів 2012/2014 та 2014/2019 років у вимірі загальної, внутрішньо системної та позасистемної волатильності. Досліджено особливості трьох видів електоральної волатильності на рівні основних регіонів України: Захід, Центр, Південь і Схід. Окреслено значення партійних переваг регіонів в контексті електоральної волатильності. Відпрацьовано методику обчислення загальної електоральної волатильності з допомогою індексу М. Педерсена та внутрішньо системної і позасистемної волатильності на підставі модифікованих Е. Пауеллом та Д. Такером індексів. Спираючись на аналіз результатів соціологічних опитувань розглянуто підстави/мотиви зміни електоральної підтримки.

**Ключові слова:** *індекс електоральної волатильності М. Педерсена, загальна електоральна волатильність, внутрішньо системна електоральна волатильність, позасистемна електоральна волатильність, партії, сталі партії, нові партії, регіон, область, Україна.*

The problems of electoral choice are among the determinants in every democracy. This is due to the political weight of the elections, as the preferences of citizens determine the passage of some political parties to parliament and not the passage of others; encouragement and ranking of the support level for political development programs represented in the elections by parties; ultimately outlining the direction of the country's political development for the period before the next election and the team of politicians who have to ensure the appropriate direction of development. The citizens' voting also reveals the level of adequacy of party proposals in the form of a program and specific candidates to current public expectations and challenges. Thus, the stability and variability of the electoral position of citizens is closely linked to the delineation of the list of major political actors represented in the legislature and who determine the vector of political development of the country or influence it, as well as with the party stability. As a result, a stable and changing electoral position of citizens can be considered an important indicator that can identify sensitive political phenomena and processes of democratic countries. The issues of electoral volatility in Ukraine in Central and Eastern Europe have recently been the subject of analysis, both among Ukrainian scientists<sup>1</sup> and scientists from other countries<sup>2</sup>. At the same time, the predominant focus of researchers on the problems of changing electoral agents at the national level is noteworthy, while regional features of volatility remain outside the scope of analysis. We assume that the view that the national indicator reflects mainly the average level for each region may take place. Instead, as a working hypothesis, we believe that there are regional features of electoral volatility both between existing regions and in relation to national characteristics.

We based the research methodology on the index of electoral volatility suggested by M. Pedersen, by which he meant «a net change in the system of polling stations due to individual

<sup>1</sup> Боднараш Г. Електоральна волатильність країн Центральної та Східної Європи: порівняльний аналіз // Політологічна та соціологічна ністудія. Т. X. Виборчі процеси в Україні та постсоціалістичних країнах: зб. наук. праць / наук. ред. А. М. Крутлашова. – Чернівці: Букрек, 2011. – С. 120-135; Романюк А. С., Литвин В. С. Порівняльний аналіз політичних інститутів країн Вишеградської групи та інших країн Центрально-Східної Європи: монографія, А. С. Романюк, В. С. Литвин. – Львів: ЛНУ імені Івана Франка, 2016. – С. 344-348; Romanyuk A. Shift in electoral support at the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine // Studium Europae Środkowej Wschodniej, 2019, #11. – P. 6-15; Політичні партії і вибори: українські та світові практики: зб. ст. і тез за результатами четвертої міжнародної наукової конференції "Політичні партії і вибори: українські та світові практики" (пам'яті Юрія Романовича Шведа) від 9 листопада 2019 року / за ред. Анатолія Романюка і Віталія Литвина. – Львів: Львівський національний університет імені Івана Франка, 2020. – Вип. 4. – 400 с.

<sup>2</sup> Sikk A. How unstable? Volatility and the genuinely new parties in Eastern Europe // European Journal of Political Research. – 2005, V.44. – P.391-412; Mainwaring S., Zoco E. Political sequences and the Stabilization of Interparty Competition. Electoral Volatility in Old and New Democracies // Party Politics, 2007, Vol. 13 (2). – P. 155-178; Jan-Erik Lane, Svante Ersson. Party System instability in Europe: Persistent Differences in Volatility between West and East? // Democratization, 2007, Vol. 14 (1). – P.92-110; Powell E.N., Tucker J. New Approaches to Electoral Volatility: Evidence from Post communist Countries. – APSA (2009): Toronto Meeting Paper, 2009. – papers.ssrn.com; Epperly B. Institutions and Legacies: Electoral Volatility in the Post-Communist World // Comparative Political Studies, 2011, V.44. – P.829-853; Gherghina S. Party Organization and Electoral Volatility in Central and Eastern Europe. Enhancing voter loyalty. – Routledge, 2015. – 192 p.; Crabtree C., Golder M. Party System Volatility in Post-Communist Europe // British Journal of Political Science. – 2016, V.47 (1). – P.229-234; Emanuele V., Chiamonte A., Soare S. Does the Iron Curtain Still Exist? The Convergence in Electoral Volatility between Eastern and Western Europe // Government and Opposition. – 2020, Vol 55 (2). – P.308-326.

vote transfer», which indicates «the extent to which party power is redistributed from one election to another between parties who lost and won the election». He suggested a formula for calculating electoral volatility or the so-called electoral volatility index, according to which:

$$V = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n |p_{i(t)} - p_{i(t+1)}|}{2},$$

where:  $V$  is index of electoral volatility (Pedersen);  $n$  is the number of parties;  $p_i$  is the percentage of votes received by the party in the period  $t$  and  $t + 1$ ;  $\sum^n$  is the sum of the results of the parties; and  $i=1$  is designation of parties with seats in parliament (i.e. parties that have prosecuted their representatives to the legislature as a result of parliamentary elections)<sup>3</sup>.

The electoral volatility index is calculated on the basis of the results of two consecutive elections  $t$  and  $t + 1$ . The results of all political parties that participated in the elections and received a result of at least one vote or more are taken into account. The electoral volatility index is calculated in the range from 0 (no change) to 100 (complete change), provided that the smaller is the figure obtained by the calculation according to Pedersen's formula, the lower is the electoral volatility in any calculated case.

The suggested by M. Pedersen index is considered to be general indicator of electoral volatility. At the same time, the subsequent studies have led to a modification of the methodology by separating the electoral variability of the sustainable political parties, i.e. those that participated in both elections, and the electoral variability of new parties, i.e. those that participated only in the next / scheduled elections. We are using the practices of E. Powell and D. Tucker, who suggested calculating the internal systemic volatility (as type «B» of the electoral volatility) after the formula:

$$B.V = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n |p_{i(t)} - p_{i(t+1)}|}{2},$$

where:  $B.V$  is index of intra-system (type «B») electoral volatility;  $n$  is the number of parties that are stable in terms of representation in parliament;  $p_i$  is the percentage of votes received by the party in the period  $t$  and  $t + 1$ ;  $\sum^n$  is the sum of the results of the parties; and  $i=1$  is designation of stable parties with seats in parliament (i.e. parties that, as a result of parliamentary elections, stably nominate their representatives to the legislature)<sup>4</sup>. Regarding non-systemic electoral volatility (as type «A» of the electoral volatility), the scientists have suggested the calculation after the formula:

$$A.V = \frac{\sum_{o=1}^n p_{o(t)} + \sum_{w=1}^n p_{w(t+1)}}{2},$$

where:  $A.V$  is index of non-systemic (as type «A») electoral volatility;  $o$  are the political parties and / or blocs that «came out» and participated in the elections only in the period  $t$ ;  $w$  are the parties that «entered» and participated in the elections only in the period  $t + 1$ ;  $n$  is the

<sup>3</sup> Pedersen M. The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility / Morgens Pedersen // European Journal of Political Research. – 1979. – Vol. 7. – No. 1. – P. 1–26; Pedersen M. Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility in European Party Systems, 1948–1977: Explorations in Explanation / Morgens Pedersen // Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change / Hans Daalder, Peter Mair. – Beverly Hills, 1983. – P. 29–67.

<sup>4</sup> Powell E.N., Tucker J. A. New Approaches to Electoral Volatility: Evidence from Post-communist Countries. – APSA (2009): Toronto Meeting Paper, 2009. –P.6.

number of batches that are taken into account;  $p$  is the percentage of votes received by the parties  $o$  in the period  $t$  and  $w$  in the period  $t + 1$ ;  $\Sigma n$  is the sum of the results of the parties;  $o = 1$  and  $w = 1$  are designation of the respective parties with seats in parliament<sup>5</sup>. Accordingly, the total aggregate volatility index (V) will add up or predict the sum of both intra-systemic and non-systemic electoral volatility<sup>6</sup>.

We are up to analyze the results of the parliamentary elections of 2012/2014 and 2014/2019 at the national and regional levels of Ukraine. According to the constitution, Ukraine is a unitary state consisting of 24 regions, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and two cities with a special status. In 2014 due to the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the armed support of separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, Ukraine temporarily does not control the territory of Crimea and part of the territories of these two regions. There are different approaches among researchers, journalists and politicians regarding the separation / separation of existing regions into separate regions, depending on the grounds for division. As a basis for our division, we have chosen the system of allocation of four regions adopted by the sociological agencies of Ukraine: West, Center, South and East<sup>7</sup>.

We calculated the results of political parties within the national multi-member constituency on the basis of official CEC (Central Electoral Commission) data. The practice of modifying the names of political parties between the two elections has raised certain questions. In particular, this applies to the case of the 2014/2019 elections. On the eve of the 2019 elections, the Bloc of Petro Poroshenko changed its name to «European Solidarity», moving away from using the name of the leader in its name. Since the basis of the party in organizational terms remained unchanged, we considered them as distinctive names of one party. Certain questions were raised by the situation with the «Opposition Bloc» party, which split into two parts on the eve of the 2019 parliamentary elections, and one of these parts retained its name. Based on the fact that the party did not significantly modify its own program and kept the name and part of the membership base and structure, we treat it as a successor.

By means of these indices, we have calculated indicators of general volatility and intra-systemic, which applies to stable political parties and non-systemic, relatively new parties at the level of Ukraine and individual regions from all four regions. In the Western community, we chose as an example: Volyn and Lviv regions; in Central – Vinnytsia and Chernihiv regions; in the South – Mykolaiv and Odessa ones. Since the Eastern region includes only three oblasts and in two of them – Donetsk and Luhansk – a certain part of their territories is controlled by separatists with the support of the Russian Federation, in this case we used data for only one oblast – Kharkiv one.

<sup>5</sup> Powell E.N., Tucker J.A. *New Approaches to Electoral Volatility: Evidence from Post-communist Countries*. – APSA (2009): Toronto Meeting Paper, 2009. – P.5.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. – P.7.

<sup>7</sup> These regions include the following regions: West – Transcarpathian, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Volyn, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi and Chernivtsi; Center – Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Sumy, Poltava, Vinnytsia and Kirovohrad; South – Odessa, Nikolaev, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Dnieper; East – Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk. See: ratinggroup.ua

In order to track the recipients of the transfer of electoral support, we used the results of a poll when studying the directions of the electorate. We are aware that the format of the poll is somewhat hypothetical, as only completed elections can record the change and transfer of electoral support. However, a poll allows you to get information, albeit subjective, from a particular citizen. Accordingly, in this way we can see the main options for new electoral preferences.

**Table 1.** Comparison of electoral volatility according to the results of the parliamentary elections 2012/2014 and 2014/2019 at the national level and in relation to certain regions of Ukraine

	2012/2014			2014/2019		
	Total	Sustainable parties	New parties	Total	Sustainable parties	New parties
<b>Ukraine</b>	<b>84,13</b>	<b>20,87</b>	<b>63,26</b>	<b>74,9</b>	<b>22,66</b>	<b>52,24</b>
Volyn region	83,94	29,42	54,7	69,64	17,93	51,71
Lviv region	87,94	34,71	53,23	59,74	31,86	27,88
Vinnytsia region	85,77	27,59	58,18	73,76	23,98	49,78
Chernihiv region	74,25	20,56	53,69	73,66	25,52	48,14
Mykolaiv region	81,71	15,51	66,20	81,71	23,51	58,20
Odessa region	82,61	34,15	48,46	82,62	22,33	60,29
Kharkiv region	84,26	15,7	68,56	79,61	26,28	53,33

As we can see, none of the regions has the same indicators of electoral volatility at the level of general and internal and non-systemic. The highest indicator of general electoral volatility in the case of the 2012/2014 elections is in Lviv region, and the lowest one is in Chernihiv region. Accordingly, the largest indicator of the change in the level of support for permanent political parties was in the Lviv region, which, in our opinion, indicates the preservation of relative trust in these parties and the assessment of their potential. At the same time, the relatively high volatility of regular parties affects / limits the level of support for new parties, or their choice. The highest rate of increase in the votes of new political parties fell on the Kharkiv region with a simultaneous minimal changed support of the sustainable parties. To some extent, these results are due to the specifics of the events of 2014, when early parliamentary elections actually recorded the results of the Revolution of Dignity, which led to powerful changes in Ukraine's political arena due to the de facto closure of one of the country's largest political parties– Party of Regions, and the formation of a number of new parties that have declared their European orientation and focus on reform: the Popular Front, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, the Samopomich Association and the Civic Position (Anatoliy Hrytsenko). Together, they received more than 58% of the votes and, with the exception of Hrytsenko's party, entered parliament and formed the basis of the parliamentary majority.

In our opinion, electoral volatility in terms of oblasts cannot be considered in the abstract as a certain programmed sequence of the arrival of new political parties in the next elections. The positioning of new political parties, or awareness of the characteristics of these new parties, is a rather sensitive factor. We cannot interpret positioning as ideological, as it is difficult to classify the majority of political parties operating on the political scene of Ukraine in terms of their ideological orientation. However, there is a certain political positioning regarding the current parties. It does not concern the whole range of issues that are traditionally covered by ideology, but only a certain part of the issues that are particularly sensitive in Ukrainian society. In particular, they include dichotomous problems: Ukrainian language and Russian language; orientation to the West and the attitude to Russia; support for the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the prospects of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate; attitude to the national liberation movements of the 20th century and an assessment of the Soviet past. In this context, all previous elections, especially the presidential elections, have shown differences in electoral preferences between voters in western and central Ukraine, on the one hand, and representatives of eastern and southern Ukraine, on the other. For the territories that include western and central Ukraine, the definition of historical Ukraine is often used, as they were mainly part of Kievan Rus and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Accordingly, the territories and populations of most of the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine were formed after the end of the Russo-Turkish wars and the annexation of these territories and the Crimea to the Russian Empire in the late 18th century. Thus, the residents of the western and central regions mostly support political parties that defend the Ukrainian language, focus on democratic countries in the face of NATO and the EU, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, and positively assess the national liberation movements of different times and mostly negatively the Soviet period in Ukrainian history. The residents of the eastern and southern regions mostly have divergent position on these worldview issues and on the support of political parties.

Regarding the parliamentary elections analyzed by us, the leaders of electoral sympathies were recorded at the level of Ukraine and the vast majority of regions. In particular, in 2014 – the Popular Front (PF) and the Bloc of Petro Poroshenko (BP). Both parties declared their orientation towards the EU and the corresponding set of values. In the course of the elections, their opposition in terms of values and geopolitical orientations was the Opposition Bloc (OB). During the 2019 elections, the Servant of the People party gained an absolute advantage in the country and in the regions. In this election, the pro-Western program was typical for the following parties: European Solidarity, Voice, A-UU *Bat'kivshchyna* (Fatherland) and Groysman's Ukrainian Strategy. Accordingly, the promoter of the pro-Russian strategy was the party Opposition Platform – For Life. To characterize the predominant orientation of the four regions of Ukraine, we considered two leaders of the parliamentary elections in each region, since the selection of only one does not give an adequate picture in the context of the dominant mood of Ukrainian citizens: in 2014 due to the Revolution of Dignity and in the course of the 2019 parliamentary elections, which took

place after the confident victory of V. Zelensky in the presidential election and a strong public demand for change in society and the arrival of new politicians.

**Table 2.** Leaders of regional electoral sympathies in the parliamentary elections of 2014 and 2019

Region	2014		2019	
	Name of the party	%%	Name of the party	%%
Volyn	Popular Front	33,22	Servant of the People	41,76
	BP	16,89	AUU Fatherland (Fatherland)	13,08
Lviv	Popular Front	33,03	Voice	23,09
	BP	20,42	Servant of the People	22,03
Vinnytsia	BP	37,49	Servant of the People	37,91
	Popular Front	22,41	Groisman's Ukrainian Strategy	15,39
Chernihiv	BP	21,46	Servant of the People	50,67
	Popular Front	19,49	AUU Fatherland (Fatherland)	14,28
Mykolaiv	BP	20,64	Servant of the People	52,18
	OB	15,88	OPFL	18,99
Odessa	BP	19,63	Servant of the People	47,03
	OB	18,05	OPFL	23,35
Kharkiv	OB	32,16	Servant of the People	42,72
	BP	15,17	OPFL	26,55

As we can see from Table 2, pro-Western political parties prevailed, in the regions of Western and Central Ukraine in the course of the 2014 and 2019 elections, while pro-Russian political parties prevailed in the regions of Southern and Eastern Ukraine. It is noteworthy the result of 2014 in Kharkiv region, where the Opposition Bloc received the largest number of votes, which testified to the special political position of some voters immediately after the Revolution of Dignity, the annexation of Crimea and the aggression in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Accordingly, when we consider volatility indicators and record the parameters of intra-systemic and non-systemic, it is necessary to prevent that in the regions we have identified transitions occur among different sets of parties with clearly articulated geopolitical orientations and publicly delineated value orientations.

As a part of the poll conducted in Lviv region on August 4-15, 2020, we surveyed a group of respondents who changed their party preferences by refusing to support the political party

they voted for in the 2019 parliamentary elections. We have included to this reference group those who have declared their readiness to support another political party or will not run in local elections, as well as those who do not plan to confirm last year's election and have not yet determined which party he / she represents intend to vote. For this category of respondents, we asked about the reason for the change in their political preferences / priorities. Out of a total of 1,200 respondents, 373 stated / mentioned that they had changed the political party they were ready to support in the next (local) elections, which was 31.1%. We are aware that some respondents may have forgotten who they voted for or did not want to acknowledge the change in preferences. At the same time, an interesting trend, which we have already recorded earlier is being traced, and it consists in hiding one's own electoral choice in the last elections if it does not coincide with the dominant tendencies or does not correspond to the prevailing sentiments at the time of the poll. In particular, only 4.9% of our respondents said that they supported the candidates of the political party «Voice» in the 2019 parliamentary elections, although according to the results of these elections in Lviv region, the party received a relative majority of 23.09%. A similar situation is typical for the voters of the «Servant of the People» party, when only 16.5% of respondents confirmed their position, although 22.03% voted for it in the elections. Instead, 29.0% of respondents said that they voted for «European Solidarity», which at the time of the poll was the leader of the sympathies of the region's residents, but in the course of the 2019 parliamentary elections it was supported only by 19.87% of voters. In this case, we capture the psychological feature of the average voter to identify himself/herself with the leader of the group / lollipop and «to forget» the previous version, which from today's perspective looks already suboptimal, especially since no one will be able to check it.

**Table 3.** What caused you to change the party for which you are ready / will not vote?<sup>8</sup>

Motivation of the decision	%
Dissatisfaction with the results of work / non-fulfillment of election promises	61,7
In the local elections, I support a different political party than in the parliamentary elections	9,9
By the positive information for another political party	8,0
Be the negative information about the political party he/ she voted for	7,5
Influence of acquaintances	2,8
Other	6,4
Difficult to answer	13,6

As we can see from Table 3, the dominant motive for the political agent changing, respondents note dissatisfaction with the results of work, or non-fulfillment of election promises. It should be noted that to some extent this statement is convenient because it is universal and shifts responsibility from the voter to the political actor who was supported by the voter. The reason for this conclusion is that the participants of the focus groups, in their absolute majority, do not know

<sup>8</sup> Current archive of the Ukrainian Center for Public Opinion Research "Socioinform".



the content of election programs / promises of political parties / party candidates in the majority constituencies and therefore such a statement is somewhat incorrect. We must also keep in mind that this assessment is subjective and reflects an emotional assessment of dissatisfaction with one's own expectations that determined the former choice. At the same time, we must recognize that the programs of the vast majority of parties and candidates in the majority constituencies are common and built on a single stencil «for all the good, against all the bad». They have little focus on the distinct interests of specific social groups, the only thing they take into account the regional political preferences mentioned earlier. This position is manifested in a quick disappointment in the previous «hope» and the search by the respondent / citizen for a new political agent who should «do as the voter wants». The phenomenon of such expectations, in our opinion, forms a group of voters who, after the previous and on the eve of the new elections, are looking for another «new» party that will «do them good». As we can see from the example of parliamentary elections within Ukraine, such a group of sympathizers of the «new» is significant, at the same time the presence of such a group determines a kind of public demand for the production of new parties on the eve of each election<sup>9</sup>. To some extent, this is a public demand for populism and the perception of populism by the parties themselves as a tool to attract support from voters.

The trend of electing / supporting a new political agent in the next parliamentary elections is clearly visible in the results of the parliamentary elections in Lviv region. Each election brought a new leader of sympathies, who received a relative majority over other political parties.

**Table 4.** Changing political agents / leaders of political preferences by voters of Lviv region

Election year	Pedersen's index	Party, leader, of the election	Result in %%	Key Campaign Messages
2002	62,56	Victor Yushchenko's «Our Ukraine» Bloc (2002) <sup>10</sup>	63,93	Opposition to the power of President Leonid Kuchma. support for reformers
2006	63,13	«Our Ukraine» Bloc (2006)	37,95	Patriots, supporters of the Maidan, reforms
2007	15,81	Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc	50,38	Other, more successful and more correct «orange»
2012	35,93	AUU «Freedom» (Freedom)	38,02	Radical patriots, able to resist the PR
2014	82,14	Popular Front (2014)	33,03	Participants of the Maidan of Dignity, participants and volunteers of anti-terrorist operation, supporters of the European integration
2019	67,76	VOICE (2019)	23,09	New politicians who were not in power

A common feature of all leaders of parliamentary elections in the Lviv region was their novelty and belonging to patriotic or national democratic political parties. The only exceptions

<sup>9</sup> According to the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, which registers new political parties, 232 parties were registered in the run-up to the 2014 parliamentary elections, and an additional 43 parties were registered after the previous 2012 parliamentary elections. On the eve of the 2019 parliamentary elections, 352 parties (+ 120) were registered.

<sup>10</sup> The year of proclamation / registration of the party / electoral bloc is indicated in the brackets

were the early parliamentary elections of 2007 and the early parliamentary elections of 2012. However, during the election it was not a question of a new agent of political sympathies, but of a more correct or more radical one in comparison with the previous elections. This to some extent explains the low volatility index in relation to these elections and the predominance of internal volatility.

Thus, we can state that the parliamentary elections of 2014 and 2019 recorded a high level of electoral volatility in Ukraine, which is mainly due to the transfer of voter support to new and political parties. Within the main regions of West, Center, South and East, overall electoral volatility is generally similar or commensurate. Instead, there are differences in the characteristics of the political parties to which voter preferences are transferred. There is a relative proximity of political advantages of the inhabitants of the West and the Center, who prefer the party, oriented to the EU, the Ukrainian language, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and positively assess the national liberation struggle of the 20th century. The basis of electoral volatility, according to voters themselves, is frustration with the results of the parties that came to power as a result of the previous elections. The psychological attitude to the rapid success of new parties is an independent factor that stimulates the formation of new party projects and their predominantly populist orientation. Instead, the inhabitants of the South and East regions adhere mainly to opposite geopolitical and value orientations.